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Abstract
In India, as in most countries where trade in human organs 
is legally prohibited, policies governing transplantation from 
living donors are designed to identify and exclude prospective 
donors who have a commercial interest in donation. The effective 
implementation of such policies requires resources, training and 
motivation on the part of health professionals responsible for 
organ procurement and transplantation. If professionals are 
unconvinced by or unfamiliar with the ethical justification of 
the relevant laws and policies, they may fail to perform a robust 
evaluation of prospective donors and transplant candidates, and 
to act on suspicions or evidence of illicit activities. I comment here 
on a recent paper by Aggarwal and Adhikary (2016), in which 
the authors imply that tolerance of illicit commercialism in living 
kidney donation programmes is not unreasonable, given the 
insufficiency of kidneys available for transplantation. I argue 
that such tolerance is unethical not only because of the harmful 
consequences of kidney trafficking, but because professional 
tolerance of commercialism undermines public trust in organ 
procurement programmes and impairs the development of 
sustainable donation and transplant systems.
Introduction
The use of financial incentives to increase living kidney 
“donation” has been the subject of debate among ethicists 
and transplant professionals since the 1980s. The persisting 
problem of insufficient supply of human kidneys for 
transplantation in many countries is repeatedly cited as a 
rationale for the introduction of legal markets in kidneys (1). 
Illicit trade in kidneys also remains a widespread problem, 
and some commentators have argued that the introduction 
of regulated markets – sometimes described as “incentive 
programmes” – would reduce such trafficking and prevent the 
harms associated with the black market (eg. 2). Aggarwal and 
Adhikary draw attention to this complex issue in the context 
of India, presenting an ambivalent position on the incentive 
debate (3). In this commentary, I clarify some of the points 
they raise and contend that a permissive approach to kidney 
trafficking is ethically unjustifiable. Specifically, I argue that 
Aggarwal and Adhikary underestimate the negative impact 
of kidney trafficking on organ sellers, transplant recipients, 
and the broader organ donation and transplantation system. I 
further argue that regulated incentive programmes are likely 
to replicate many harms associated with illicit kidney markets 
and suggest that a more robust approach to the prevention of 
kidney trafficking, together with greater investment in efforts 
to reduce the burden of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) and 
to facilitate and encourage living and deceased donation, will 
ultimately improve equitable access to transplantation in India.
The law governing transplantation in India
Aggarwal and Adhikary refer to the Transplantation of Human 
Organs Act (THOA), 1994, which was enacted in 1995 (4). 
It specifically prohibited payment for organs, and required 
review by an authorisation committee of all prospective 
living donors who are unrelated to the intended recipient, 
defined as all those not spouses, children, parents or siblings, 
but who wish to donate “by reason of affection or attachment 
towards the recipient or for any other special reasons”(4).1 
This Act was notably amended in 2008 and 2011 (7), partially 
to address concerns that the process of the review of 
prospective unrelated donors was not effective in identifying 
and addressing cases in which paid “donors” were presented 
as altruistic unrelated donors. The amended Act now requires 
verification and countersigning of documents attesting 
to the identities of and relationships between prospective 
donors and recipients, and additional approvals for foreign 
nationals (7). The Act also lays down greater penalties for those 
convicted of illegal activities (7).
The impact of these recent amendments to the THOA may not 
be observed for some time. The successful implementation 
of new policies and guidelines requires motivation, training 
and a removal of barriers, which may include the negative 
attitudes of some health professionals. If the ambivalence of 
Aggarwal and Adhikary reflects that of the broader community 
of transplant professionals in India, it is conceivable that many 
may be reluctant to change their practice so as to comply, for 
example, with more stringent requirements for prospective 
donor evaluation. Fortunately, the reports of the scandals 
concerning domestic trafficking noted by Aggarwal and 
Adhikary suggest that authorities within India support the 
enforcement of this law. Anecdotally, recent reports of Indians 
travelling to Sri Lanka to buy and sell kidneys suggest that 
opportunities to sell within India may have been reduced 
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(8). Nevertheless, trade in organs undoubtedly persists in 
India, and the support of all health professionals involved 
in donation and transplantation is essential for the success 
of efforts to eliminate this market and to ethically provide 
opportunities for transplantation within India. 
Regardless of its legality, trade in kidneys is an 
unhelpful “solution” to shortages
Aggarwal and Adhikary suggest that it is unclear whether 
recipients of commercial transplants benefit and kidney sellers 
are harmed in the long term. However, evidence from the 
black market in kidneys in India, Pakistan and elsewhere, and 
from the legal, albeit poorly regulated market in Iran, shows 
that kidney sellers do suffer long-term harms (9). Although 
there are limited data concerning the long-term outcomes, 
the majority of kidney sellers studied experience a decrease 
in their economic, psychosocial and physical health status (9). 
Loss of employment opportunities, social stigmatisation, and 
ill health experienced following the sale of a kidney are likely 
to exert a negative influence on the long-term well-being of 
kidney sellers and their communities, especially in the absence 
of a substantial increase in their financial status as a result of 
the sale.
Recipients of transplants using organs from paid “donors” may 
also fail to obtain the anticipated benefitsof their purchase. 
Those who travel abroad to purchase kidneys (“transplant 
tourists”) have higher rates of complications such as infection 
and poorer graft survival (10). Within domestic markets, a study 
in Pakistan found that recipients of kidneys from paid donors 
were thrice as likely to suffer complications as those receiving 
related donor transplants, with five-year graft survival being 
45% and 80%, respectively (11).
Illegal trade in kidneys has a negative impact on legitimate 
programmes of organ donation and transplantation. As 
Aggarwal and Adhikary note, where there is an opportunity 
to buy a kidney, people are often unwilling to solicit or accept 
a kidney from a related donor. Awareness of the trade among 
the public and health professionals fosters a perception that 
access to transplantation is determined by ability to pay, and 
that professionals involved in donation and transplantation 
are likely to be influenced by opportunities to profit from 
organ procurement. Unfortunately, such perspectives may 
partly reflect the reality. The resultant distrust in the integrity 
and justice of programmes and professionals responsible for 
organ procurement from the living and the deceased, and the 
stigmatisation of donation as a commercial activity performed 
by the financially desperate undermine participation in 
altruistic donation opportunities. 
Despite the claims of those who advocate a regulated 
market in kidneys from living “donors”, many of the ethical 
concerns about illegal trade are unlikely to be addressed 
through regulation. I have argued elsewhere that market 
regulation may be less effective in addressing concerns 
about harms than advocates suggest, even in a more robustly 
regulated healthcare setting such as that of the USA (12). 
This is partly due to the fact that where payments are used to 
incentivise kidney “donation”, the burden of donation will fall 
disproportionately upon the poorest members of society. This 
population is particularly vulnerable to the risks associated 
with kidney donation, as its members often lack resources 
such as access to primary health services which may serve as 
protective factors; and face higher lifetime risks of illness, injury 
and psychosocial insults that may influence the outcomes of 
elective nephrectomy (12). Careful screening of all prospective 
kidney donors to ensure that risk factors may be addressed, eg 
through the provision of long-term follow-up care, and that 
high-risk candidates are deferred is essential. The poor should 
not be categorically excluded from donation opportunities 
– the success of the altruistic related donor programme at 
the Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation in Pakistan 
shows that a predominantly poor donor population may have 
excellent outcomes (11,13) – but the provision of a lump sum 
payment designed to recruit rather than to care for donors 
exploits society’s most vulnerable for the benefit of the rich.
Iran’s oft-cited “model” of a regulated market in kidneys reveals 
disturbing similarities with the black markets of Asia and Latin 
America. Kidney sellers are predominantly poor, young and 
under-educated men (14).  The prices of kidneys vary according 
to the availability and desperation of sellers, and the ability of 
transplant candidates to pay (15). The quality of the evaluation 
of prospective kidney sellers also varies, and this influences 
the potential risks accepted by the sellers and recipients. The 
informed consent process may also be flawed, and there is 
limited follow-up care and monitoring of sellers, such that the 
actual risks of selling a kidney in Iran are difficult t o e stimate 
(14). The existence of a market has effectively “crowded out” 
living related donation, with stigmatisation not only of living 
but also deceased donation, despite the fact that payments 
are not made to deceased donor families. Although not all 
reports of outcomes for kidney sellers in Iran are negative, 
it is by no means an exemplar of ethical policy and practice. 
Furthermore, it has not solved the problem of organ shortages 
in Iran; a recent report states unequivocally that “the never-
disappearing waiting list for kidney transplantation [in Iran] 
will be growing steadily” (16). 
Claims in the USA that the current shortage of kidneys there 
would be resolved by the introduction of an “incentive 
programme” for donors remain speculative (1). In the Indian 
context, it is probable that the creation of a legal market in 
kidneys would increase supply at least in the short term, 
assuming the eligibility criteria for selling a kidney would 
not exclude those suffering a financial crisis, lacking long-
term health insurance and so on. There is a sufficiently large 
population of Indians for whom selling a kidney would 
represent the best – if not the only – economic solution to an 
immediate financial crisis. Such a market would nevertheless 
be harmful to the participants, exploitative and inequitable, 
just like the existing illicit market in kidneys.
Although an individual market transaction may on occasion 
benefit b oth t ransplant r ecipient a nd k idney s eller, a nd i n 
Indian Journal of Medical Ethics Online First Published May 9, 2016
[ 3 ]
many cases will result in the saving of a life, such benefits do 
not provide sufficient justification for a public policy legalising 
trade. What an individual may be justified in doing in the 
absence of alternative options is not always justified on the 
part of governments and health professionals, who have 
the obligation to consider the broader impact of individual 
actions and the interests of all societal members. For example, 
although lives may regularly be saved when members of the 
public break into pharmacies to steal medications required 
by critically ill children, it does not follow that governments 
should legalise the ad hoc robbery of pharmacies. Rather, 
governments should consider the most effective, sustainable 
and least harmful means of achieving the overarching goal of 
saving lives. With regard to the goal of preventing deaths from 
ESRD, markets in kidneys are neither the sole, nor the optimal 
solution; nor are they a solution to endemic poverty.
Ethical solutions to the kidney shortage
There is enormous potential to develop both living and 
deceased organ donation programmes in India. The success 
of deceased donation programmes in Tamil Nadu and 
Chandigarh demonstrate that dramatic improvement is 
possible in the current performance of organ procurement 
programmes across India if sufficient efforts are made and 
support provided (17). In addition, many strategies that have 
proven successful in other countries are yet to be fully explored 
in India, such as those noted by Aggarwal and Adhikary: 
kidney paired donation and the use of extended criteria 
deceased donors. The costs of becoming a living donor may 
prevent many from donating to their relatives, especially in 
the absence of universal health coverage. Financial barriers to 
living donation have been observed in many countries, and will 
undoubtedly influence donation rates in India. Reimbursing 
or covering the costs of living donation– and even deceased 
donation, where necessary – is not ethically contentious: the 
World Health Organisation, the Declaration of Istanbul, and 
many national, regional and international professional societies 
actively encourage efforts to promote financial neutrality in 
organ donation (5). 
Those who cannot afford donation are also likely to be 
excluded from transplantation due to financial barriers. Thus, 
when evaluating the scope of the ethical duty to save the lives 
of those with ESRD and when advocating strategies to address 
the organ shortage, policy-makers and health professionals 
must carefully consider whose lives may be inadvertently 
prioritised, and who may bear the burdens associated with 
particular strategies. If the aim is indeed to maximise the 
saving of lives of people with ESRD, the most effective method 
of doing so is surely to invest in the prevention of ESRD rather 
than the recruitment of living donors.
Tolerating occasional violations of the THOA on the grounds 
that deceased donation programmes in India do not yet 
provide sufficient kidneys for transplantation is not an ethically 
justifiable strategy. It suggests a lack of moral courage and 
a willingness to make use of the poor for the sake of the 
privileged few. All those responsible for legislation, policy-
making, and clinical practice in donation and transplantation in 
India must make an unequivocal commitment to best practice, 
which means ethical practice. Compromising on ethics 
undermines the societal and professional foundations on 
which successful and sustainable altruistic living and deceased 
donation programmes are built.
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Note 1 The definition of “unrelated donor” differs according to the laws 
governing organ procurement in each country. The term should not 
be considered synonymous with paid donors. Covering the costs that 
may be associated with living donation, such as loss of income during 
time off work, should also not be confused with payment for organs. 
Covering such costs does not leave the donor financially better off, and 
thus provides no financial incentive for donation (5). Aggarwal and 
Adhikary incorrectly suggest that Singaporean law permits the sale of 
organs. Like many countries, Singapore permits donation by a range of 
genetic relatives and emotionally related individuals, and does cover 
some costs associated with living donation for eligible donors. However, 
trade is strictly prohibited and a comprehensive screening programme 
seeks to identify and prevent commercialism (6).
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